Why did you resign from IMN?
I resigned because I couldn’t carry on with my work anymore with not enough resources and a lack of basic [tools] to create proper television. There was criticism in the Iraqi street against IMN and I agreed with that criticism. But unfortunately I couldn’t do much. People were asking for more information, for a better news bulletin, for more programs, for better programs. It took me many years to create credibility and [cultivate my] reputation among the [Iraqi] people, and I didn’t want to lose it for the sake of other people.
Who is responsible for lack of support you received?
I believe that the people in the White House, in Washington, they would like to see a media network which they could be proud of and which could be an example for the rest of the Middle East. Unfortunately, the dream was given to the wrong people to fulfill. What there should have been were people who know how to run a media outlet, people who have experience in the field, people who have an understanding of the political situation of the country, of the culture of the country, and people willing to invest in this project. [There wasn’t.]
IMN has been criticized for being both a media network and the mouthpiece of the Coalition Provisional Authority.
One of the problems with IMN is that the identity of IMN is not clear. It’s not clear whether it’s an Iraqi BBC or whether it’s a government network or a private network. In the beginning when we started, the goal was to create something like the BBC, a public-service radio and television [network]. But then after a while, management said, “No, this is not our mission, we are the Coalition’s radio and TV.”
Could you give an example of how the Coalition influenced your content?
They came with ideas for one or two programs which we felt were not really good ideas. But we were told, “You should have [them] whether you like it or not.” One of the programs was about law. It was funny because the American supervisor of the Ministry of Justice wished to have this program on IMN and we–I mean, to have a weekly program about law when there are no courts and no really functioning law in the country–we felt that this was a really stupid idea. So, I was hosting the first episode with four judges and one lawyer, and they all agreed on the program that there were no courts and no functioning law. So then we thought, what’s the second part of the show going to be about?
What are the consequences of not delivering good media in Iraq?
Iraqis are very hungry for information. They want to know what’s happening around them, in the north, in the south. They would like to know what’s going to happen in the future and this need becomes more urgent under the current circumstances. And at the same time, Iraq is a country filled with conspiracy theories–for instance, some Iraqis believe that Saddam is hiding in Washington or that the U.S. Army is distributing materials to Iraqi kids that could make them impotent in the future. Of course these rumors are strengthened by reports from a number of the Iraqi newspapers today on the market. There are many newspapers today but thereis very little journalism. So in this environment, it’s very important to have information available all the time. And the best channel is to have proper media.
What needs to happen to establish proper media in Iraq?
Under Saddam, Iraqi media was like a big advertising company marketing one product called Saddam. Many pens became rusty. So there is a need to provide as much training as possible on the art of journalism and the rules of journalism. There is a need to regulate also because the situation right now is really chaotic–it’s not freedom, it’s chaos. Newspapers are inciting, calling [on Iraqis] to kill people. And there must be, from the Coalition’s side, proper investment in the media, a clear strategy, and the right people in the right places. I believe that the freedom of expression exists in Iraq, but it is very important to learn how to use freedom.
