Extend the mission of ISAF, the 4,650-strong international peacekeeping force in Kabul, at least through Afghan elections planned for 2004.
Send a high-level civilian official to coordinate foreign aid. President Hamid Karzai’s infant government can’t, and big donor nations, especially in Europe, are concerned about corruption.
Send a senior officer to coordinate the U.S. role in helping internal security and improve liaison on the ground; this would free the current commander, Lt. Gen. Dan McNeill, to hunt Al Qaeda.
Speed the creation of an Afghan national Army. Regional warlords pay their militias more than the troops in the national Army get. Possible fixes: have ISAF do some training as well, and–the most radical proposal–accept the reality of the warlords’ militias and train them to become the core of a national Army.
The assassination of VP Haji Abdul Qadir in early July, the threats to Karzai’s own life and the signs that rising violence in the countryside could wreck the international-aid programs have given the policy review new urgency. In Afghanistan in mid-July, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz persuaded Karzai to accept U.S. bodyguards. “We can’t risk losing him,” said a U.S. policymaker. But Karzai’s real complaint is that without cash to run his embryonic government, without aid to disburse to the regions and without the forces to bring order, he is essentially powerless.
The review’s outcome? Probably a compromise. “You will see the composition of the [U.S.] force evolve: fewer combat troops, more civil affairs,” said one official.
