When I first heard that the war had begun, I thought of President Bush. In a movie, people run around during a crisis, picking up telephones and yelling instructions. In a real crisis, the top people are very much alone. Many officials head for the foxholes, occasionally throwing out memoranda designed to absolve them of responsibility for their actions. Usually there are only two or three people willing to make tough decisions. President Bush has earned the nation’s gratitude for his fortitude in holding the coalition together during the months of buildup, gaining Congressional backing and steering the country to the point where allied and domestic support coincided. But even in the best-planned operation, there are hours in which a leader in his position must wonder why he ever expended so much time and effort trying to get elected.
I also thought of the challenges the President will have to face once the war is over. After all, the purpose of victory is to ensure a lasting peace. To that end, the United States should move to implement a number of measures in the immediate aftermath of the war:
An arms-control policy for the gulf to prevent a recurrence of the weapons race that contributed to this conflict.
Some kind of agreement on economic and social development under the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which embraces the nations of the gulf. Other Arab allies of the U.S. could join this effort, which would be designed to defuse the argument that this is a conflict of rich against poor.
A process to address the original Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute. Direct negotiations between the two countries would be inherently unbalanced, because of the disparity in their size, which has only been compounded by Iraq’s invasion and pillaging of its neighbor. But some issues are susceptible to legal determination, such as drilling rights or the location of the boundaries. These could be put to the International Court of Justice, while remaining issues are handled within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council.
An international program for imposing tough sanctions against terrorism. The world must not again stand impotently transfixed by thousands of hostages. Countries harboring terrorist groups must be confronted with severe reprisals, including military measures if other pressures fail.
Over the long run, our biggest challenge will be to preserve the new balance of power that will emerge from this conflict. And that will not prove easy, given conventional American thinking about foreign policy. Today, it translates into the notion of “a new world order,” which would emerge from a set of legal arrangements and be safeguarded by collective security. The problem with such an approach is that it assumes that every nation perceives every challenge to the international order in the same way, and is prepared to run the same risks to preserve it. In fact, the new international order will see many centers of power, both within regions and between them. These power centers reflect different histories and perceptions. In such a world, peace can be maintained in only one of two ways: by domination or by equilibrium. The United States neither wants to dominate, nor is it any longer able to do so. Therefore, we need to rely on a balance of power, globally as well as regionally. We must prevent situations where the radical countries are tempted by some vacuum every few years, forcing us to replay the same crises over and over again, albeit with different actors.
This is why, in the final analysis, all of the so-called diplomatic options would have made matters worse. Each would have left Iraq in a militarily dominant position. None addressed the root problem of the gulf’s lack of security, which drew 415,000 Americans into the region in the first place–a deployment that certified the gap in military capability between Iraq and the moderate Arab countries. Any diplomatic solution that did not produce a dramatic reduction of Iraq’s military power would have been a victory for Saddam Hussein. From then on, he would not have needed to engage in actual physical aggression. He could have let Iraq’s demonstrated superiority speak for itself, progressively undermining the governments that supported the United States. He would have been able to exploit his position within OPEC to achieve an increase in oil prices, as well as a greater share of production. These two steps would have given Iraq vast additional resources to increase its already huge military buildup, including nuclear and missile programs. The United States would have been left with the choice of keeping major ground forces in the gulf, or of destabilizing the region by withdrawal. The practical result of the military operations now in motion will be to bring into balance the military capability of Iraq against its neighbors in the gulf.
Yet ironically, maintaining equilibrium in the region requires us to navigate between a solution that leaves Iraq too strong and an outcome that would leave Iraq too weak. After all, one of the causes of the present crisis is the one-sided way the Western nations rushed to the defense of Iraq in its war against Iran, forgetting that if Iran was excessively weakened Iraq might become the next aggressor. It would be ironic if another bout of tunnel vision produced an Iraq so weak that its neighbors, especially Iran, seek to refill the vacuum.
Ideally, one military goal should be to pull the teeth of Iraq’s offensive capability without destroying its capacity to resist invasion from covetous neighbors. We should take care that Scud missiles are not reintroduced. We should prevent Iraq from importing high-technology equipment, including high-performance aircraft with long ranges, and from reacquiring the means to manufacture biological and nuclear weapons. However, Iraq’s capacity to defend itself with conventional weapons against ground attack from its neighbors would in the long run not be a threat to stability but a contribution to it.
The new balance of power in the region cannot be based on the permanent presence of American ground forces. This was the weakness of diplomatic solutions that would have kept Iraq’s military preponderance intact. A major Western ground force in the area would inevitably become the target of radical and nationalist agitation. The cultural gap between even the best-behaved American troops and the local population is unbridgeable. After a brief period, American ground forces would be considered foreign intruders. There would be a repetition of our experiences in Lebanon, including terrorism and sabotage. American ground forces in the area should be withdrawn after victory; residual forces should be stationed beyond the horizon–at sea or perhaps at a few remote air bases. Any monitoring of Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait should be done by Arab members of the coalition.
The difficulty of stationing Western ground forces in the area for an extended period was one reason why sanctions almost surely could not have achieved our objective. It would have been impossible to keep over 400,000 troops in the area for the 12 to 18 months that even optimists thought were needed for sanctions to succeed. But if we started to withdraw any American forces during that time–or to rotate them, as the term of art had it–it would have set off a panic among our Arab allies.
Military equilibrium, however, cannot be the sole aim of American policy in the gulf. It is essential that America learn to become less dependent on oil and generate a viable energy program. We cannot suffer through an energy crisis every decade. We should stress conservation and develop alternative sources of energy, avoiding the self-indulgent attitudes of the 1980s, when plentiful oil caused the search for alternative energy sources to be largely abandoned.
We must also remember the possibility of renewed Soviet designs on the region. For the time being, domestic problems keep the Soviets from running any significant foreign risks. But 200 years of Russian expansionism toward the gulf indicate a certain proclivity. And this drive may be compounded as Moscow’s preoccupation with its more than 50 million Muslim citizens grows. After some domestic equilibrium is restored, the Kremlin may become more active in the Middle East–especially in Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey, which border the Soviet Union. If the Muslim republics remain Soviet, Moscow will be wary of Muslim radicalism lest it inflame its own Muslim population. But if the Muslim republics break off and become independent, Moscow may seek favor in the breakaway states by embracing Islamic radicalism–especially if the Muslim world turns more extremist.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a new balance of power will revive prospects for progress on the Arab-Israeli conflict. A peace process dominated by Saddam Hussein, or heavily influenced by him, would have been a debacle. For it would have taught the lesson that radicalism, terrorism and force are the road to diplomatic progress in the Middle East. This is why President Bush was right in resisting the linkage of the Kuwait and Palestinian problems.
But with Saddam defeated, moderate Arab leaders will gain in stature, America’s credibility will be enhanced and Israel will have a breathing space. This new equation should be translated into a major diplomatic effort within a few months of victory. Far from amounting to linkage and a submission to blackmail, such a move, after Saddam has been defeated, should be viewed as an opportunity resulting from the success of the moderate forces.
Progress will depend on a proper perception of the issues involved. The Arab-Israeli problem is usually stated as a negotiating issue: how to convene an international conference that returns Israel to the 1967 frontiers, defines a new status for Jerusalem, induces the Arabs to “accept” Israel and provides international guarantees for the resulting arrangements. I have grave doubts about every one of these propositions.
First, I am very skeptical about an international conference. For the United States would be totally isolated at such a forum. The behavior of France just prior to the gulf war is a small foretaste of what would happen. Instead of being a mediator, America would be maneuvered into the role of Israel’s lawyer, while Israel would regard any independent position we took as a betrayal of its interests. No sensible nation would voluntarily throw itself into such a maelstrom. Since everything depends on our influence with Israel anyway, I would much prefer a diplomatic process in which the United States, the moderate Arab countries and Israel are the principal participants.
Second, for Israel a return to pre-1967 borders and the creation of a Palestinian state are not negotiating issues but matters of life and death. The distance from the Jordan River to the sea is less than 50 miles; the corridor between Tel Aviv and Haifa in terms of the 1967 frontiers is about 10 miles wide. It would be difficult to squeeze two states into such a limited area in the best of circumstances. But the PLO has been in mortal conflict with Israel during the entire existence of both groups. How can such an arrangement possibly be compatible with security?
Moreover, a return to pre-1967 borders would still leave almost as many Arabs under Israeli control as live on the West Bank minus Gaza. How is one going to justify that one group of Arabs must live under Israeli rule while other Arabs are entitled to self-determination? Thus a restoration of pre-1967 borders, coupled with the formation of a Palestinian state, could easily turn into the first step to the further reduction of Israel, if not its ultimate destruction.
Third, acceptance of Israel is not only a legal but above all a psychological challenge. And I find it hard to believe that any legal formula can by itself provide for Israeli security. After all, Kuwait lived in a state of legal peace with Iraq without being able to prevent Iraqi aggression. And Saddam attacked Israel in a war from which Israel had kept totally aloof because it calculated that many Arabs would support Iraq against Israeli retaliation, no matter how justified. American leaders understandably felt this danger real enough to advise against retaliation. But when reaction to an unprovoked attack becomes an international issue, Israel is still certified as a pariah and is held hostage for the actions of others.
Fourth, how does one define “credible guarantees”? After all, even in the case of Kuwait, where there was unanimous international support for the victim (something that would be inconceivable with Israel), it took six months to organize resistance while the country was looted and pillaged and the populated expelled.
For all these reasons, the peace process as currently conceived is likely to lead to a dead end. It forces each side to accept something they find unbearably difficult: for the Israelis, it is a Palestinian state; and for the Arabs, it is the Israeli state. I know of no conflict between Arab nations–let alone between the Arabs and Israel–that has ever been resolved by the method suggested for the Palestinian issue: namely, with one conclusive negotiation resulting in a legal document intended to last for all time.
A revived peace process should begin by redefining the objectives. A final settlement at this moment seems a legalistic mirage. On the other hand, the status quo will sooner or later sound the death knell for moderates on all sides. As it is, too many Israelis consider the peace process a one-sided means to gain acceptance without sacrifice. They are unwilling to give up any occupied territory, or will do so only if de facto Israeli control is maintained. Too many Arabs, especially in the PLO, see in the Middle East a replay of Vietnam, where peace talks were used to soften up the opponent for escalating pressures leading to his ultimate collapse.
An interim solution might seek to introduce the moderate Arab governments, fresh from the victory over Iraq, as a buffer between Israel and the PLO. It might reduce the amount of territory Israel is asked to give up in return for something less than formal peace. A possible approach, mediated by the United States, might unfold like this:
A conference would be assembled, under the aegis of the U.N. secretary-general, composed of the United States, Israel and the Arab states allied with America in the gulf crisis.
The moderate Arab countries would agree to act as trustees for territories that are returned to Arab control for a specified amount of time, say five to 10 years.
The moderate Arab states would also commit themselves to demilitarizing these areas under U.N. supervision.
Israel would give up all of Gaza and the most heavily populated areas of the West Bank, retaining only territories essential to its security. It would be allowed to participate in verifying the demilitarization of any territory it evacuates.
Precise government arrangements would be established by agreement, but would not for the interim period lead to a separate state. As a practical matter, the trustee powers would undoubtedly establish an administration containing individuals acceptable to the PLO.
If this particular scenario turned out to be impractical, some other interim approach must be sought to break the deadlock. The aftermath of an allied victory over Iraq will offer a perhaps never-to-recur opportunity. Moderate Arab states are disillusioned with the PLO, which in effect has backed Iraq. They are also dismayed by the fact that the PLO has never unambiguously disassociated itself even from terrorism aimed at the moderate Arabs. As a result, these governments may no longer be prepared to give the PLO a veto over their actions.
As for Israel, it must avoid two possible nightmares. If it insists on holding onto every square inch of occupied territory, it could suffer the fate of South Africa and find itself ostracized, and even ultimately under U.N. sanctions. On the other hand, if it follows the maxims of conventional wisdom and gives up all the occupied territories, it runs the risk of winding up like Lebanon, gradually squeezed to the point of obliteration. For its own sake, Israel must find a middle way. And there is no better moment to do that than when its most dangerous enemy has been defeated.
I do not envy the American negotiator assigned the task of distilling an interim settlement from the confusing passions of the Middle East. Still, with Iraq’s military capacity reduced, the moderate Arab leaders, as well as Israel, should be able to turn to the peace process with authority and confidence. President Mubarak of Egypt, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia–and even King Hussein of Jordan, whatever the maneuvers imposed by his vulnerability–are unusually intelligent and prudent. Even President Assad of Syria, by no means a moderate, signed an interim agreement with respect to the Golan Heights which has been in force for 17 years and has been meticulously observed. All these leaders might in the end go along with an intermediate approach as the only way to break an even more dangerous deadlock. And there are surely Israeli leaders who recognize that a gradual approach will provide their best prospect for a satisfactory outcome–especially when the moderate Arabs are triumphant and radical Arabs are in retreat.
America should act as a mediator in this effort, having earned the trust of both sides. Our initial challenge may well be philosophical. The best way to produce a successful negotiation is to advance a new concept, to convince both sides that the proposed new course serves their common interest. If that demonstration cannot be made, no negotiating gimmick can serve as a substitute.
In several thousand years of recorded history, the Middle East has produced more conflicts than any other region. As the source of three great religions, it has always inspired great passions. It is therefore unlikely that any one negotiation can bring permanent tranquility to this turbulent area. An Arab-Israeli negotiation will not end all the turmoil, because many Middle East problems are quite independent of that conflict. Fundamentalism in Iran has next to nothing to do with the Palestinian issue, though Teheran has exploited it. And Saddam Hussein would have tried to dominate his neighbors even if the Palestinian problem did not exist. But what the Arab-Israeli conflict has done is to make it difficult for the voices of moderation in the Arab world to cooperate with their supporters in the West. Victory in the gulf will create a historic opportunity to alter that particular equation–and it should be seized.
