For nearly 25 years, Israelis have been told that holding the Golan Heights is essential to their defense against an implacable enemy. Two months after seizing the towering heights from Syria in the 1967 Six Day War, the Israeli cabinet privately decided not to give it back without direct talks with Syria. Adamant in refusing to recognize Israel, Syria’s Hafez Assad went to war in 1973 in a failed effort to retake the Golan. In 1981, Israel formally annexed the area. Military leaders argued that the area gives Israel “strategic depth” to ward off a Syrian attack. Now Israel faces a new challenge. Syria joined the coalition that defeated Saddam Hussein; Assad and other Arab leaders are demanding a payback: pressure on Israel to accede to U.N. demands that it trade the territory it won in the Arab-Israeli wars for regional security.

By hinting at a deal on the Golan Heights, Shamir hoped to seize the role of peacemaker, alleviating pressure for a far more difficult settlement with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Foreign Minister David Levy, who championed the strategy, reasoned that the domestic political fallout would be manageable. “The Golan doesn’t have the same emotional pull on Israel as the rest of the occupied territories,” said a U.S. policymaker. Unlike the West Bank, it contains few Biblical sites. The arid soil is strewn with lava rocks from the extinct volcanoes that pushed the earth high above the northern Galilee. About 15,000 native Druze villagers eke out a living raising sheep and goats. An additional 8,000 Israeli settlers have had no better luck; their remote, dwindling communities depend mainly on the paychecks of soldiers based along one of the world’s most closely monitored frontiers. Many of them would welcome a Sinai-style settlement in which America repaid Israelis forced to uproot. “I am already waiting for the moment the heights will be returned,” said Rafi Elmzass in the Golan city of Katzrin. “Then I will build a villa in Tel Aviv and buy a ‘92-model Volvo with my compensation.”

For Israeli right-wingers, the need to keep the Golan remains an article of faith. But among the military the “strategic depth” argument has weakened. U.S. officials contend the Golan is no longer militarily significant to either side in the era of long-range missiles. Syria now can hit all of Israel. Its arsenal includes advanced Soviet jets and improved Scud missiles recently acquired from North Korea. According to Israel, Syria has chemical warheads. But Israel need not fear the Golan in Syrian hands if the area is fully demilitarized, U.S. officials argue. U.N. peacekeeping forces could extend their area of control, established in 1974, to the Israeli-held region. A neutral international force might also take over the civil administration of the Golan for a period before gradually returning control to Syria. The Israelis would insist on keeping military eavesdropping posts on the heights - an idea the Israeli Army’s chief of staff alluded to last week. “A political solution is much more than territory,” said Gen. Dan Shomron before making a farewell tour of the Golan. “Other elements enter which lessen the danger.”

Assad has won the grudging respect of the Israeli brass by scrupulously observing the 1974 disengagement accords on the Golan. Since then the Golan has been Israel’s quietest frontier. But entering into direct talks with Israel would represent a major concession for Assad; he has insisted on an overall Mideast peace conference. And Israel would first demand full recognition from Syria. Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa last week reiterated Syria’s own precondition: “Any talk about ending the state of war or building confidence measures before ending the Israeli occupation is like putting the cart before the horse,” he said.

Still, U.S. officials were encouraged by Shamir’s Golan gambit. In spite of his disclaimer, Shamir was signaling Assad that the Golan Heights could be on the table in bilateral talks, they said. But serious doubts remain about whether either side would be willing to make the necessary concessions to get to the table at all.