All in all, it was excellent preparation for Iraq.
At some point in this brief but intense campaign of words, Petraeus might have been forgiven for reflecting that Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz’s famous dictum—“War is merely a continuation of politics by other means”—could usefully be rewritten. In a Washington mobilizing for 2008, war is merely the excuse for politics by other means. Certainly, in Room 325 the front lines were clear enough: Dems to the left of him; Republicans to the right of him; the heavy cannon of Sens. Carl Levin (the chairman), John Warner (the ranking GOP member), John McCain and Joseph Lieberman directly in front of him. The Democrats criticized President Bush’s planned “surge” of U.S. troops into Iraq as wrong-headed because, as Levin insisted, pouring in more soldiers would merely relieve pressure on Iraq’s political leaders to make the necessary compromises. The Democrats invited Petraeus to agree with this. Failing that, they tried to lure him to acknowledge that the 21,500 soldiers and Marines allotted to the surge were far too few to have a chance of success. The Republicans—well, most of them—wanted Petraeus to applaud the president’s plan, prophesy catastrophe in the event Iraq fell apart and support the notion that any Senate resolution condemning the surge would damage the morale of U.S. forces in Iraq.
Caught in this cross-fire, Petraeus tried to defend a middle ground with a fusillade of heavy-caliber soundbites: “The situation in Iraq is dire. The stakes are high. There are no easy choices. The way ahead will be very hard. Progress will require determination and difficult U.S. and Iraqi actions. But hard is not hopeless.” Petraeus added: “None of this will be rapid. In fact, the way ahead will be neither quick nor easy, and there undoubtedly will be tough days. We face a determined, adaptable, barbaric enemy. He will try to wait us out. In fact, any such endeavor is a test of wills, and there are no guarantees.”
What was swiftly lost in the fog of partisan warfare was the discomfiting argument underpinning much of what Petraeus had to say: that if Iraqi politicians are a disappointment, the United States bears a good deal of the blame. “Iraq’s new government, its fourth in three and a half years, has found it difficult to gain traction,” Petraeus acknowledged. “Though disappointing, this should not be a surprise. We should recall that, after the liberation of Iraq in 2003 every governmental institution in the country collapsed. A society already traumatized by decades of Saddam’s brutal rule was thrown into complete turmoil, and the effects are still evident throughout the country and in Iraqi society. Iraq and its new government have been challenged by insurgents, international terrorism, sectarian militia, regional meddling, violent criminals, governmental dysfunction and corruption … and the elections that gave us such hope actually intensified sectarian divisions in the population at the expense of the sense of Iraqi identity.”
Aside from that—and Petraeus elaborated later in the hearing on further gross errors—Operation Iraqi Freedom has presumably been a triumph. But Petraeus’s implicit message—that it may behoove Washington to approach Iraq now in a spirit of some humility, to give Iraq’s politicians the time and understanding they need—was overrun in the first skirmish. The parties could essentially agree on only two things: Iraq’s politicians just aren’t shaping up; and the soon-to-be full general (the job carries a fourth star) is clearly the fellow to go and sort things out. The Dems added a further twist. They proclaimed their enthusiastic support for Petraeus while simultaneously arguing against the troop surge—even though the general said flatly, in answer to a question from McCain, that without the extra troops he couldn’t do the job he was being sent to do. As Sen. Edward Kennedy put it, unruffled: “I have concerns about this policy, but I have every intention of voting for you.”
Petraeus ran into real trouble only when Sen. Joe Lieberman, a defender of the war, lured him out of position, inviting the general to agree with the proposition that a resolution against the surge “would give the enemy some encouragement.” “That’s correct, sir,” said Petraeus. That response in turn brought withering counterfire from Senator Clinton. “I, among others on this committee, have put forward ideas about disapproving the escalation not because we in any way embrace failure or defeat, but because we are trying to get the attention of our government and the government of Iraq,” she said.
Petraeus seemed to give ground. “I am not a politician. I’m a guy who wears a uniform and has for 32 years plus,” he said a little later. He said he respected both the oversight role of Congress and “the frustration of the American people.” But then he plunged back into the fray: “The question has to be, I guess—at least that I would ask myself—is: what message will the enemy take from this; what message will the soldiers and I take from this.” It was a gutsy stand, and Petraeus clearly realized how exposed he was. “Minefields are best avoided and gone around rather than walked through on some occasions, [so] I’d like to leave that one there,” he added. It was an afterthought that came several steps too late for prudence.
Senators Levin and Warner—the chair and past chair of the committee—finally rescued Petraeus. Levin wrapped up the hearing by asking what he later called “clarifying questions” that tactfully distanced Petraeus from the surge decision. “You haven’t decided that that’s the right policy. You agree with the policy, but the policy decision was not yours. Is that correct ?” A relieved Petraeus replied: “That’s correct, Mr. Chairman.”
It was Warner, though, who—in rescuing Petraeus—pointed to the foreboding message of the hearing. To Petraeus he observed mildly: “I hope this colloquy hasn’t trapped you into some responses that you might later regret.” For himself, he said, “I go back 35, 36, 37 years when, as secretary of the Navy, I sat at that very table where you are in this very room … trying to explain that war.” He didn’t have to say which war he meant, but everyone in the hearing room seemed to stiffen at the allusion to Vietnam. Warner continued: “And I heard the cross-fire in the questions and in the debates. And this hearing today brought it all back.” Of course, he said, “there’s no real parallel in the conflicts, as such,” before adding: “But there is this situation of the nation pulling back.”
“Yes, sir,” said Petraeus. And suddenly the thought of Chinook helicopters lifting off from refugee-crowded roofs in the Green Zone didn’t seem so impossible.
